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THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER
LABOR BOARD DEFERRAL TO ARBITRATION
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH*
Gerald E. Berendt**
David A. Youngerman***
In the interest of avoiding the disruptions of commerce associ-

ated with labor disputes, a significant portion of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) protects the statutory rights of private sector
employees to choose the labor organizations that represent them in
collective bargaining with their employers.' Section 8(a) of the
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1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988), which states:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or
interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to
the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees. ...
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by
workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of rep-
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NLRA2 makes these protections operational by prohibiting a number of employer practices, including the refusal to bargain with
properly designated unions.3 Although the NLRA grants the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) authority to protect these
rights by administering the NLRA's unfair labor practice machinery, the NLRA has also been interpreted as placing a premium on
the voluntary resolution of labor disputes by the parties themselves.4 Over the years, the federal courts and the NLRB have recognized grievance arbitration as the preeminent vehicle for voluntary dispute resolution, and they have declared a national policy
favoring arbitration for this procedure.5
The policies of protection of statutory rights by the NLRB and
resolution of labor disputes by arbitration serve the ultimate statutory objective of avoiding labor disputes that may disrupt commerce.6 However, instances arise when these two policies poten-

resentatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
Id. (emphasis added).
2. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1989), which provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title [providing the right of employees
to self-organize and bargain collectively];
(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any
labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . . ;
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any
labor organization . . . ;
(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he
has filed charges or given testimony under this subchapter;
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title [providing for employee representatives and their elections].
Id.
3. Id. § 158(a)(5).
4. Id. §§ 151, 153. Section 151 states the purpose of the NLRA as encouraging
the free flow of commerce by protecting collective employee bargaining power; section
153 of the NLRA provides for the creation and administration of the National Labor
Relations Board's power.
5. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). These cases
are collectively known as the Steelworkers Trilogy. The United States Supreme Court
established that contractually agreed procedures for grievance arbitration will be upheld
in federal courts as part of a national policy favoring arbitration as the method for
voluntary dispute resolution.
6. NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1989).
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tially clash, raising questions concerning the NLRB's primary jurisdiction.' In unfair labor practice cases involving related questions
of labor contract interpretation, who should proceed first, the
agency or the arbitrator? And if the arbitrator proceeds first, what
weight, if any, should the agency accord the arbitrator's award
when deciding the unfair labor practice charges? These questions
are likewise present and equally vexatious in the public sector,
where grievance arbitration plays at least as prominent a role in
the federal and state collective bargaining schemes. For example,
under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (IELRA), parties
to collective bargaining agreements are statutorily mandated to
include in their contracts grievance provisions culminating in final,
binding arbitration.8
This Article concentrates on a labor law controversy persisting
for over twenty-five years: the extent to which a labor relations
agency should defer to an arbitrator's decision when the agency
decides related statutory issues raised in an unfair labor practice
proceeding. The NLRB has vacillated between two different approaches to this problem, neither of which addresses whether the
arbitrator's factual findings and contractual interpretations actually
enable the NLRB to resolve the unfair labor practice. Rather, under
the NLRB's competing tests, the arbitration award is deemed to "resolve" the statutory issues if: (1) the statutory issue was both presented to and considered by the arbitrator,' or (2) the contractual
and statutory issues were factually parallel and the arbitrator was
generally presented with the facts relevant to resolving the statutory issue."

7. GERALD E. BERENDT, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 289-300 (1984) (discussing tension between labor board's objectives of encouraging arbitration and upholding its statu-

tory jurisdiction).
8. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 115, para. 5/10(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993).

9. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), overruled by Altoona
Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984). "In specific terms, we will no longer honor the results
of an arbitration proceeding under Spielberg unless the unfair labor practice issue before
the Board was both presented to and considered by the arbitrator." Suburban Motor
Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146-47.
10. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984). The NLRB stated:
Accordingly, we adopt the following standard for deferral to arbitration awards.
We would find that an arbitrator has adequately considered the unfair labor
practice if (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor
practice issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice.
Id. at 574.
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This Article proposes an approach which differs from both of
the doctrines alternatively employed by the NLRB. The alternative
policy proposed was recently developed and employed by the Illinois
Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) in its 1992 University
of Illinois decision." Under the IELRB approach, the administrative agency defers to the arbitrator's findings of fact and interpretations of the contract, but the
agency independently decides the
12
statutory questions before it.

This Article maintains that the IELRB approach better advances the goals of a deferral policy: to fulfill the agency's dual
statutory mandates to protect statutory rights and resolve disputes
while making the most efficient use of the agency's limited financial
resources. 3 Moreover, under the IELRB approach, an agency can
meet its statutory obligation to interpret and apply the statute
without ceding that responsibility to an arbitrator. Significantly,
the IELRB test is more consistent with the national policy favoring
voluntary resolution of labor disputes through arbitration. 4
This Article initially sets forth the types of issues that arise
when employer conduct allegedly violates both a collective bargaining agreement and the applicable labor relations act. It then reviews and analyzes the NLRB's attempts to formulate a doctrine
governing deferral to an arbitration award. Next, this Article discusses and explains the IELRB's formulation. It then discusses the
practical and policy advantages of the IELRB's approach. Finally,
this Article anticipates potential issues associated with the application of the IELRB approach in cases involving agency determination of mandatory subjects of bargaining and withheld evidence.
L THE OVERLAP OF CONTRACTUAL AND
STATUTORY CLAIMS
The question of labor agency deferral to an arbitrator's award
arises when a labor dispute raises issues grievable under the
parties' collective bargaining agreement and also actionable under
an applicable labor relations statute." An allegation of an unlaw11. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. (Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill.
(LRP)
12.
13.
14.

1035, at 155 (IELRB 1992); see infra pp. 187-97.
University of Ill., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) J 1035, at 157.
See supra notes 1-2 for the policy and text of the NLRA.
See supra notes 1 & 4 for the NLRA's policy statement.
15. See BERENDT, supra note 7, at 289 (discussing concurrence of jurisdiction
between labor boards and arbitrators and their appropriate relationships to contracting
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ful unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment provides a commonly encountered example of such a situation. 6 Both
the NLRA and the IELRA have been interpreted to prohibit employers from taking unilateral action on terms and conditions of
employment over which bargaining is required, unless the employer
has first bargained to impasse or agreement with the employees'
exclusive bargaining representative.' Such allegations often turn
on the scope of the parties' contractual obligations or past practices
on the subject at issue.'"
Labor boards confront the interplay between statutory and
contractual procedures in two situations. 9 First, unfair labor practice charges may have been filed even though the parties have yet
to utilize the contractual grievance and arbitration procedures."
Second, the parties may have proceeded to an arbitration award
and the prevailing party may seek to bar further litigation of the
unfair labor practice charge.2 '
The IELRB has held that "in those cases alleging conduct
which may constitute both contract breach and statutory violations,
we... [will] refer the matter to arbitration, but retain jurisdiction
over the case to insure that any statutory rights at stake are protected."2 2 When a case is referred to the grievance and arbitration
process, jurisdiction is retained "for the purpose of entertaining
appropriate and timely motions that the dispute has not been
promptly submitted to arbitration, that the dispute has not been
resolved or that the grievance or arbitration procedures have not
been fair and regular or have reached a result repugnant to the
Act."" The IELRB uses the term "referral" to describe suspension
of the statutory process pending the outcome of grievance and arbi-

parties).
16. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
17. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743-47 (1962) (concluding that employer violated
§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of NLRA when employer changed wage increase schedules, merit increases, and sick leave provisions without first reaching impasse in collective bargaining);
Vienna Sch. Dist. No. 55 v. IELRB, 515 N.E.2d 476, 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
18. Katz, 369 U.S. at 744-47 (analyzing contractual agreement between parties).
19. See BERENDT, supra note 7, at 290-300 (discussing occasions and treatments of
arbitration by labor boards).
20. Id.
21. See Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
1091, at 214,
22. West Chicago Sch. Dist. No. 33, 5 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP)
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 141
220 (IELRB 1989), affd, 578 N.E.2d 232 (Ill.
(Ill. 1991). The referral issue was not the subject of the appeal in that case.
23. Id. at 221.
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tration proceedings.' "Deferral" is reserved for post-award review
of the statutory issuesY These processes are also often referred to
as "pre-arbitration
deferral" and "post-arbitration deferral," respec2
tively.

6

Such concepts are not unique to the IELRB" The NLRB has
utilized referral and deferral doctrines for a number of years.2"
The Illinois State Labor Relations Board and Local Labor Relations
Board have similar policies under the Public Labor Relations Act in
Illinois.29 Research and a survey conducted by the Authors of other
federal, state, and local labor relations agencies disclose that nearly
all have some referral and deferral policy. Most agencies follow one
of the two NLRB approaches without extensive discussion."
The policies employed by the NLRB and other labor agencies
have similar rationales. In West Chicago School DistrictNo. 33, the
IELRB, relying on a prior NLRB decision, 3 identified two important objectives of a referral and deferral policy.32 Such a policy protects statutory rights by insuring that the IELRB's processes remain available to adjudicate statutory issues not "resolved" by the
arbitration proceeding.33 In addition, a referral policy
accommodate[s] the public policy favoring voluntary settlement of
labor disputes through the arbitral process .... "The long and successful functioning of grievance and arbitration procedures suggests to us that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the utilization of such means will resolve the underlying dispute and make it
unnecessary for either party to follow the more formal and some24. See id. at 220 n.16.

25. Id. at 221.
26. Id.
27. See Charles B. Craver, Labor Arbitration as a Continuation of the Collective
Bargaining Process, 66 CH.-KENT L. REV. 571, 607, 616 (1990).
28. Id.
29. Laborers Local 1092 v. City of Chicago, 563 N.E.2d 1080 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)
(holding local labor relations board deferral to arbitration award invalid when local board
changed standard for deferral after award issued); City of Mount Vernon, 4 Pub. Empl.
Rep. Ill. (LRP) % 2006, at 45, 46 (ISLRB 1988) (discussing referral issue); Chicago
Transit Auth., 1 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) % 3004, at 17, 18-19 (ILLRB 1985) (discussing referral issue in light of policies).
30. The results of this survey will be included in a subsequent article building
upon this one.
31. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
32. West Chicago Sch. Dist. No. 33, 5 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) 1091, at 214,
221 (IELRB 1989), affd, 578 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d 141
(Ill.
1991).
33. Id.
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times lengthy, combination of administrative and judicial litigation
provided for under our statute. At the same time, by our reservation of jurisdiction... we guarantee that there will be no sacrifice

to function in a
of statutory rights if the parties' own processes fail
34
manner consistent with the dictates of our law."

Other theoretical justifications for these policies have been
articulated. Judge Harry Edwards of the Circuit Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia has posited that referral and deferral
are actually the product of the exclusive bargaining representative's
decision to "waive" the statutory rights at issue in favor of resolving
the dispute under the grievance and arbitration procedure." That
view recently won judicial approval in a decision authored by Judge
Edwards. 6
Referral and deferral policies have presented a number of
thorny and contentious issues. The NLRB currently allows referral
in cases involving alleged discrimination for union activities under

§ 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. 37 The District of Columbia Circuit Court
approved this rule in Hammontree v. NLRB.3" However, Chief
34. Id. (quoting Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. at 837).
35. Harry T. Edwards, Deferral to Arbitration and Waiver of the Duty to Bargain:

A Possible Way Out of Everlasting Confusion at the NLRB, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 23 (1985).
Judge Edwards has stated:
I believe that when the parties negotiate a collective bargaining agreement and
stipulate that they will arbitrate disputes arising under it, they have waived
many of their statutory rights under the NLRA. The parties' agreement, in essence, supplants the statute as the source of many employee rights in the
context of collective bargaining.
Id. at 28.
36. Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992) (holding that the NLRB's policy of deferring to prearbitration settlement was a permissible interpretation of the NLRA). Judge Edwards
stated in Plumbers & Pipefitters:
Pre-arbitration grievance settlements . . . represent a consensual resolution of
labor-management disputes through the collective bargaining process. By recognizing the validity and finality of settlements, the Board promotes the integrity
of the collective bargaining process, thereby effectuating primary goals of the
national labor policy....
[Therefore,] at least where a grievance implicates
only "waiveable" rights, we find nothing in the NLRA that prevents the Board
from showing deference to a pre-arbitration grievance settlement.
Id. at 752.
37. United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984). In United Technologies, an
employee filed a § 8(a)(3) charge with the NLRB alleging that her supervisor threatened
disciplinary action if she pursued a grievance. Id.
38. 925 F.2d 1486, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc). In Hammontree, the court held
that the NLRB can require a claimant to exhaust contractual grievance remedies before
the Board hears a § 8(a)(3) discrimination claim, reasoning that such a policy is a
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Judge Mikva issued a blistering dissent, arguing that the NLRB
should not refer charges alleging discriminatory violations of individual employee rights, as opposed to charges alleging violations of
collective rights due to unilateral changes in terms and conditions
of employment. 9
Similarly, Professor Charles Craver has argued that "[i]f grievance-arbitration procedures are viewed as a continuation of the
collective bargaining process, it becomes apparent that [referral] is
appropriate in refusal-to-bargain cases, but not in cases concerning
individual employee rights." ° In brief, the basis for this dichotomy
is that (1) refusal-to-bargain cases implicate "collective and organizational interests"41 that the union will diligently pursue, in which
there is a great congruence between the statutory and contractual
issues,42 while (2) unfair labor practice charges involving individual rights "differ significantly from collective bargaining rights"43
in that they encompass important statutory policy objectives not
protected by most collective bargaining agreements.44
The issue upon which this Article focuses has been equally
contentious: how to determine when the grievance and arbitration
procedure has in fact "resolved" the statutory issues raised, either
in an unfair labor practice proceeding referred to the arbitration
process or in a charge filed after the arbitration process has been
completed.
II. THE NLRB AND POST-ARBITRATION DEFERRAL
The genesis for deferral standards was the NLRB's decision in
Spielberg Manufacturing Co.45 The NLRB held that it would defer
to the results of an arbitration award if those "proceedings appear
to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound,

permissible construction of the Board's statutory obligation. Id.
39. Id. at 1505-06 (Mikva, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Mikva emphasized that in
Hammontree, the individual employee was forced to complain about alleged violations of
his rights to a grievance committee composed equally of management and union representatives. He likened the employee's situation to forcing a new kid at school to work
things out with two boys who beat him up rather than having the principal intervene to
discipline the boys. Id. at 1506.
40. Craver, supra note 27, at 612.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 614.
44. Id.
45. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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and the decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act."46 The NLRB in a later case
added that the arbitrator must have considered the unfair labor
practice issue, thus implementing the referral requirement that
jurisdiction be retained to determine whether the dispute is resolved in arbitration.4 7
The progeny of Spielberg have split into two sharply divided
camps over how to determine whether the grievance and arbitration
procedure has "resolved" the statutory issue. The current NLRB
standard is stated in Olin Corp.:4
[We adopt the following standard for deferral to arbitration
awards. We would find that an arbitratorhas adequately considered the unfair laborpractice if (1) the contractualissue is factually parallel to the unfair laborpractice issue, and (2) the arbitrator
was presented generally with the facts relevant to resolving the
unfair labor practice. In this respect, differences, if any, between
the contractual and statutory standards of review should be
weighed by the Board as part of its determination under the
Spielberg standards of whether an award is "clearly repugnant" to
the Act. And, with regard to the inquiry into the "clearly repugnant" standard, we would not require an arbitrator's award to be
totally consistent with Board precedent. Unless the award is "palpably wrong," i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act, we will defer.
...[Tihe party seeking to have the Board ignore the determination of an arbitrator has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating the defects in the arbitral process or award.49

Olin revised the prior NLRB standard enunciated in Suburban
Motor Freight, Inc.5" Suburban Motor Freight had itself overruled
Electronic Reproduction Service Corp.,"' which the Suburban Motor Freight Board characterized as having allowed deferral, except
in "'unusual circumstances'.., even where no indication existed as
to whether the arbitrator had considered, or had been presented

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
N.L.R.B.

Id. at 1082.
Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 886 (1963).
268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
Id. at 574 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
247 N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), overruled by Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
213 N.L.R.B. 578 (1974), overruled by Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247
146 (1980).
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with, the unfair labor practice issue involved."52
The Suburban Motor FreightBoard had instituted the following
standard to determine whether the arbitration proceeding had in
fact resolved an unfair labor practice issue:
In specific terms, we will no longer honor the results of an arbitration proceeding under Spielberg unless the unfair labor practice
issue before the Board was both presented to and considered by the

arbitrator.In accord with the rule formerly stated in Airco Industrial Gases, we will give no deference to an arbitration award
which bears no indication that the arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue of discrimination in determining the propriety of an
employer's disciplinary actions. In like accord with the corollary
rule stated in Yourga Trucking, we shall impose on the party
seeking Board deferral to an arbitration award the burden to

prove that the issue of discriminationwas litigated before the arbi53
trator.

Olin dramatically increased the number of cases in which deferral was possible, since it allowed deferral even when the arbitrator had not actually "considered" the statutory issue.5 4 The decision set off a storm of controversy, beginning with a strong dissent by one of the NLRB members55 and continuing in the various
federal courts of appeals.56
However, both NLRB tests share an inherent problem. Neither
test actually ascertains whether the arbitrator's findings and contractual interpretations enable the labor relations agency to resolve
the statutory issue pending before it. The Olin standard does not
even require that the arbitrator make any findings as to the statutory issue. 7 Rather, "adequate consideration" under Olin only
requires that the arbitrator be "presented generally with the facts
relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice" and that the contractual and statutory issues be "factually parallel." 8 Under Olin, the
"adequate consideration" standard may be satisfied even if the

52. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146.
53. Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added); see Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928
(1972); Airco Indus. Gases, 195 N.L.R.B. 676 (1972).
54. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
55. Id. at 577-81 (Zimmerman, Member, dissenting in part).
56. See Craver, supra note 27, at 618-20.
57. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
58. Id.
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arbitrator does not expressly resolve any of the factual issues relevant to the statutory claim. 9 It is enough that the facts of the unfair labor practice case were presented to the arbitrator."
Professor Craver offers this telling criticism of Olin:
The revised Olin Corp. criteria ignored the critical distinction
between arbitration and Labor Board proceedings. Labor arbitrators are merely empowered to interpret and apply pertinent contractual provisions. The labor arbitrators derive their authority
exclusively from the bargaining agreement and are not usually
authorized to apply external legal doctrines. Even when contractual issues and unfair labor practice issues may overlap, arbitrators are obliged to focus primarily upon the bargaining
agreement terms. There will thus be many instances in which
arbitral awards involving disputes that are "factually parallel" to
unfair labor practice charges, arising from the same operative
circumstances, will be not be determinative of the external [statutory] issues.6
Suburban Motor Freight also failed to distinguish between
contractual and statutory dispute resolution, although the NLRB's
mistake was one of underinclusion, rather than overinclusion as in
Olin.62 Suburban Motor Freight relied on the presence or absence
of "magic words" to determine if deferral is appropriate.6" In order
for deferral to be appropriate under Suburban Motor Freight, the
arbitrator must affirmatively state that he or she has "ruled on the
statutory issue."' However, many arbitrators are not likely to
make this type of statement.
As Professor Craver points out, grievance arbitrators perform a
"limited role."65 He cites the following description of that role by
the United States Supreme Court: "[T]he arbitrator's task is to
effectuate the intent of the parties. His source of authority is the
collective-bargaining agreement, and he must interpret and apply

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Craver, supra note 27, at 620.
62. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1980), overruled by
Altoona Hasp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984); see Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.

63. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 147 (stating that NLRB "will give no
deference to an arbitration award which bears no indication that the arbitrator ruled on
the statutory issue").
64. Id.
65. Craver, supra note 27, at 620.
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that agreement in accordance with the 'industrial common law of
the shop' and the various needs and desires of the parties."6
Accordingly, most arbitrators view their authority with restraint, confining themselves to interpreting the parties' labor contract. Unless the contract expressly incorporates external law, an
arbitrator simply has no reason to decide whether the employer has
violated a statute in addition to the collective bargaining agreement. While the statutory and contractual issues may overlap, the
arbitrator need not determine whether an employer violated its
statutory duty to bargain in good faith, for example, in order to
ascertain if the employer unilaterally changed a term of the contract.
Furthermore, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Alexander v.
Gardner-DenverCo., statutory law is a thicket in which most arbitrators avoid entanglement. 7 Enforcement of the award can be
placed at risk if the arbitrator relies too heavily on statutory law in
reaching a decision under the contract.68 Thus, in addition to being
unnecessary, resolving ultimate statutory liability may not be prudent for an arbitrator. 9
Nevertheless, Suburban Motor Freight ignored a plain truth.
While arbitrators are not likely to "rule on the statutory issue,""
they can and do mak6 factual findings and contractual interpretations that may assist the labor relations agency in resolving the
66. Id. at 622 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974)).
In Alexander, the Court stated that the arbitrator is "'part of a system of self-government created by and confined to the parties'" and "'serves their pleasure only to administer the rule of law established by their collective agreement.'" Alexander, 415 U.S. at
52-53 n.16 (quoting Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Lawv in Labor Relations, 68
HARv. L. REV. 999, 1015 (1955)). The Alexander Court also stated that "the arbitrator's
task is to effectuate the intent of the parties" with his "source of authority . . . the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 53.
67. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53.
68. Id. The Court stated:
[Aln arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of industrial
justice. He may of course look for guidance from many sources, yet his award
is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
Id. (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960)).
69. Id. (stating that arbitration awards will not be enforced if arbitrator relies on
interpretation of laws rather than interpretation of collective bargaining agreement).
70. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 146 (1980), overruled by
Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
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pending issue of law.71 Simply put, arbitrators do not need to decide ultimate statutory issues in order for their factual findings and
contractual interpretations to help the labor relations agency resolve those same issues.
III. THE IELRB'S UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS APPROACH
The IELRB's approach to deferral proceeds from an entirely
different perspective than either approach used by the NLRB.72
Because statutory and contractual issues often overlap, the IELRB
recognizes that an arbitrator's findings and contractual interpretations can easily be employed by the agency when it makes its ultimate statutory conclusions, even when the arbitrator expressly
disclaims any intention to "rule on the statutory issue." 3 In such
cases, the labor board can still perform the statutory analysis.74
However, the board can also apply those statutory standards to the
arbitrator's factual findings and contractual interpretations to determine if the contractual grievance and arbitration procedure has
"resolved the statutory issues."
Under any of the deferral theories, if the arbitrator's factual

71. See Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867-69 (1978) (Truesdale, Member,
concurring). In Kansas City Star Co., concurring Member Truesdale articulated a deferral
approach similar to that utilized in University of Illinois. Id. Truesdale advocated NLRB
deferral to an arbitrator's decision where the arbitrator had ruled on every factual and
legal issue necessary to the resolution of an issue, even if the arbitrator had not passed
on the issue itself, as long as the arbitrator's findings involved no "irregularities," "facial
errors," or inconsistency with NLRB law. Id. at 869. Truesdale asserted that this approach would prevent the arbitrator from becoming "a hearing officer who merely takes
evidence from which the Board draws its own conclusions" and would prevent diminution
of the integrity of the arbitral process. Id. at 868-69.
72. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. (Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep.
Ill. (LRP) % 1035, at 155, 156-57 (IELRB 1992).
73. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146.
74. University of Ill., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) % 1035, at 156. As the IELRB
noted:
[We said that we would retain jurisdiction over a matter referred to arbitration, where a statutory violation was also alleged, "for the purposes of entertaining appropriate and timely motions that the dispute has not been promptly
submitted to arbitration, that the dispute has not been resolved or that the
grievance procedures have not been fair and regular or have reached a result
repugnant to the Act."
Id. (quoting West Chicago Sch. Dist. No. 33, 5 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) 9%1091, at
214, 220 (IELRB 1989), affd, 578 N.E.2d 232 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d
141 (Ill. 1991)) (emphasis added by Authors).
75. Id. at 156-57 (using arbitrator's findings of fact to determine whether facts
constituted unilateral change during bargaining, statutory violation).
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findings and contractual interpretations resolve the statutory issue
once the statutory standard is applied, deferral is appropriate if the
result is dismissal of the statutory charge.76 Under the IELRB's
approach, if the arbitration proceedings have been fair and regular,
the agency will adopt the arbitrator's factual findings and interpretations of the contract. There is little issue as to whether the award
is "repugnant" to statutory policies and purposes, however, since
the labor board has actually applied its statutory standards to determine if the award resolves the statutory issues. Under those
circumstances, the labor board would be assured that the award
has effectuated statutory policies and purposes.
Moreover, this approach properly apportions arbitral and
agency authority. Appropriate respect is accorded the arbitrator as
the parties' chosen contract reader, and the agency reserves to itself
the responsibility of interpreting and applying the statute. The
board would defer to the factual findings and contractual interpretations of the arbitrator, but it would not cede its authority to determine if a statutory violation had occurred.
Deferral under such circumstances also conserves scarce administrative agency resources. There would be no reason to issue a
complaint and hold a hearing if, when the arbitrator's factual findings and contractual interpretations are viewed through statutory
lenses, the result is a statutory conclusion by the labor board that
no violation occurred.
A. The University of Illinois Decision
The IELRB's decision in University of Illinois employed the
above approach." In University of Illinois, the union filed a charge
with the IELRB, alleging that the employer had unilaterally substituted a floating holiday in lieu of Columbus Day for bargaining unit
employees.7 8 The union contended that the employer had unilaterally changed a prevailing term and condition of employment in

76. Of course, due process precludes the labor board from finding a violation of the
statute without conducting an administrative proceeding under the statute. See, e.g., §
15 of the IELRA, which requires the IELRB to "hold a hearing" on an unfair labor
practice complaint issued after an administrative investigation and to allow the respondent to "present evidence in defense against the charges." ILL. ANN. STAT. ca. 115, para.
5/15 (Smith-Hurd 1993).
77. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. (Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill.
(LRP)
1035, at 155, 156-57 (IELRB 1992).
78. Id.
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violation of section 14(a)(5) of the IELRA."9 The IELRB issued a
complaint, thus initiating the administrative hearing process."0
After the complaint was issued, the parties agreed to arbitrate
whether the employer had violated the collective bargaining agreement by changing the holiday in question."' The IELRB then referred the matter to arbitration.82 It therefore dismissed the statutory complaint, while retaining jurisdiction under an earlier, but
functionally equivalent, formulation of the West Chicago standard.83
The arbitrator denied the union's grievance, concluding that
the employer did not violate the collective bargaining agreement by
not recognizing Columbus Day as a holiday." However, the arbitrator also explicitly stated that he had not considered the criteria for
good faith bargaining under the IELRA.85
The employer then urged the IELRB to "defer" to the arbitration ruling and not to reopen the administrative proceeding. 8 The
union countered that the IELRB should not defer to the arbitration
ruling since that contractual decision did not "resolve" the unfair
labor practice issue.87
The parties presented the IELRB with a choice between the
88 The
respective standards in Olin and Suburban Motor Freight.
IELRB chose neither standard. Rather, the IELRB reviewed the
arbitration ruling to determine whether the arbitrator's factual
findings and contractual interpretations in fact answered the statutory questions posed by the IELRB complaint.89 The IELRB stated:
"The arbitrator specifically stated that he had not considered
whether the University had violated its obligation under the Act to
bargain in good faith. In making his findings of fact, however, he
considered all of the evidence necessary to resolve the unfair labor

79. Id.; see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 115, para. 5/14(a)(5) (Smith-Hurd 1993).
80. University of Ill., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) T 1035, at 155.
81. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 for discussion of the West Chicago

case.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
N.L.R.B.
89.

University of Ill.,
8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1035, at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 155-56.
Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247
146 (1980), overruled by Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
University of Ill., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. 11l. (LRP) T11035, at 155.
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practice issue."" The IELRB held:
[Tihe critical unfair labor practice issue here is whether the
University's substitution of a floating holiday for the Columbus
holiday constituted a unilateral change during bargaining in the
prevailing terms and conditions of employment, or whether it was
an action permitted by the parties' agreement.... Here, however,
the arbitrator found that the parties had agreed in the contract
that the University could set the holiday schedule unilaterally in
accordance with "Policy and Rules - Nonacademic." Furthermore,
the arbitrator found that there was no past practice of having a
Columbus Day holiday.
Given these findings of fact by the arbitrator, the University
had contractual discretion to substitute a floating holiday for the
Columbus Day holiday. Similarly, the arbitrator found that Columbus Day was a holiday only during a particular period of time
and that after that time the University was free to modify the
holiday schedule. That is, the issue of the Columbus Day holiday
had been fully bargained. These conclusions are consistent with
the statute and our case law, and not repugnant to the purposes
and policies of the Act.91
Having determined that the arbitrator's factual findings and
contractual interpretations allowed the NLRB to "resolve" the unfair labor practice issues presented in the IELRB complaint, the
IELRB concluded that "the result reached in arbitration is not
repugnant to the Act under either a unilateral change theory or a
mid-term modification theory."92 In so holding, the IELRB stated
that it was "unnecessary" to consider the Olin standard, upon
which the Acting Executive Director had relied in dismissing the
complaint.93 Rather than relying on Olin's surrogate factors, the
IELRB actually determined that the arbitrator's findings and contractual interpretations enabled it to resolve the statutory issue
without further administrative proceedings.94
In addition, it bears reiteration that the arbitrator in University of Illinois had used the "magic words" that would have precluded
deferral under Suburban Motor Freight. The arbitrator had stated
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
standard.

at
at
at
at
at

156.
156-57.
157.
157 n.1.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 48-50 for discussion of the Olin
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that he had not "considered the criteria for good faith bargaining
under the IELRA."95
The NLRB's Olin and Suburban Motor Freight approaches differ as to which party has the burden of proof on the deferral issue.
In Olin, the NLRB placed on the party resisting deferral the burden
of proving the existence of defects in the arbitration proceeding or
the award. 96 In Suburban Motor Freight, the NLRB placed on the
party seeking deferral the burden to prove that the unfair labor
practice issue was litigated before the arbitrator. 97
In University of Illinois, the IELRB did not expressly resolve
the burden of proof dispute between Olin and Suburban Motor."
However, the IELRB analysis presumed that the party seeking deferral, in this case the employer, had the burden of demonstrating
that the arbitrator's factual findings and contractual interpretations
enabled the IELRB to resolve the statutory issues in its favor.99
University of Illinois appears consistent with Professor Craver's
approach.' He recommends:
Post-arbitration deferral should not be viewed as a right, but rather a privilege. Under section 10(a) [of the NLRA], it is legislatively
presumed that unfair labor practice questions will be resolved by
the [NLRB]. In any case in which it is clear that a previous arbitral determination thoroughly and appropriately disposed of a
pending unfair labor practice charge, the NLRB should consider
deferral. The party requesting such deferral should be obliged to
demonstrate that: (1) the arbitral proceedings were fair and regular and the parties had agreed to be bound by the result; (2) the
facts relevant to the unfair labor practice case were presented to
and fully considered by the arbitrator; (3) the arbitraldecision has
effectively resolved the dispute underlying the pending unfair labor
practice charge; and (4) the arbitral conclusions are not repugnant
to the policies embodied in the NLRA."'0

95. University of 11., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1035, at 155. See supra text
accompanying notes 51-53 for discussion of the Suburban Motor Freight standard.
96. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
97. Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1980), overruled by
Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
98. See University of Ill., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) 911035, at 156-57.
99. Id.
100. Craver, supra note 27, at 620-21.
101. Id. (emphasis added); see Kansas City Star Co., 236 N.L.R.B. 866, 867-69
(Truesdale, Member, concurring).
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B. Advantages of the University of Illinois Approach
The IELRB approach has several advantages. First, it determines whether the arbitration award in fact enables the agency to
resolve the unfair labor practice issue in any given case, and thus,
it better implements the goal of the referral and deferral policy. For
those concerned that Olin dismisses statutory claims without a
thorough analysis of their merits, this case-specific approach has
much value. 2
Second, under the IELRB approach the administrative agency
never cedes its authority to interpret and apply its own statute."3
The issue of whether the arbitration award helps to resolve the
statutory questions demands a statutory analysis that only the
agency should perform. Conversely, under either Olin or Suburban
Motor Freight, the NLRB effectively relinquishes its responsibility
to interpret and apply the statute." 4 Under Olin, the NLRB only
requires that the factual issues be parallel and that the relevant
facts be generally presented to the arbitrator. 5 Under Suburban
Motor Freight,the NLRB defers when the arbitrator has expressly
considered the unfair labor practice issue, thus effectively inviting
arbitrators to assume statutory responsibility. 6 Both NLRB tests
are subject to the caveat that the award must not be clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the NLRA. °7 However, that
an arbitrator's statutory analysis is not clearly repugnant does not
guarantee that it is a correct interpretation of the statute. In other
words, agency review to determine if the award is palpably wrong
is not a substitute for the agency's own statutory analysis.
Third, the IELRB approach avoids the confusion created by the
continuing controversy over whether to utilize the Olin or the Suburban Motor Freight standard. As Judge Edwards has observed, the
issue of deferral has become politicized.' Under the IELRB approach, however, it is not necessary to choose between the compet102. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
103. See id.
104. See id.; Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1980), overruled
by Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
105. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
106. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146-47.
107. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 573; Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 146.

108. Judge Edwards states: "[R]ecent sharp critiques of current [NLRB policies are
neither unusual nor surprising. Political turmoil and revision are nothing new to the
NLRB, for the Board historically has responded to, and reflected the philosophies of, the
administrations that have appointed its members." Edwards, supra note 35, at 23.
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ing NLRB standards that have come to represent the polarized
positions of labor and management. 9
Fourth, the IELRB approach provides a more precise method
for determining whether deferral is appropriate in cases alleging
violations of individual statutory rights. For example, if the parties'
contract prohibits discrimination for union activity, then an
arbitrator's determination on that issue might provide the basis for
resolving the statutory issues present in an analogous statutory
claim. In West Chicago, the IELRB did not determine whether it
was appropriate to defer to an arbitration award in a case arising
under section 14(a)(3) of the IELRA." ° Under the University of
Illinois approach, however, deferral could be appropriate in such a
case.
Fifth, the IELRB approach is consistent with the predisposition
of many arbitrators - including the arbitrator in University of
Illinois - to avoid resolving statutory issues when deciding
whether a contract has been violated."' The IELRB approach is
thus more compatible with the doctrine of arbitration than are the
NLRB standards. Indeed, the IELRB test utilizes arbitral expertise
in a more meaningful manner than either Olin or Suburban Motor
Freight, because it is a meaningful deferral to the arbitralprocess,
and thus, it more fully implements the national labor policy favoring voluntary resolution of labor disputes through arbitration."'
Sixth, the IELRB approach preserves increasingly scarce
agency resources. If the IELRB had adopted the rule of Suburban
Motor Freight, for example, it could not have deferred to the arbitration award in University of Illinois, since the arbitrator had not
"considered" the statutory issue."' The IELRB would have had to
reactivate the administrative proceeding with the attendant and
costly hearing and appeal procedure, even though the arbitrator's
factual findings and contractual interpretations had clearly enabled
the IELRB to resolve the statutory issues.

109. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill.
(Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep.
Ill. (LRP) 1035, at 155, 156-57 (IELRB 1992).
110. West Chicago Sch. Dist. No. 33, 5 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) %1091, at 214,
223 n.15 (IELRB 1989), affd, 578 N.E.2d 232 (Ill.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 584 N.E.2d
141 (111. 1991).
111. University of Ill.,
8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1035, at 156.
112. See supra notes 1-2 for the policy and text of the NLRA.
113. See Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247 N.L.R.B. 146, 147 (1980), overruled by
Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
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C. The Application of the IELRB Deferral Standard When the
Duty to Bargain Is at Issue
In University of Illinois, the parties did not dispute that the
determination of holidays was a mandatory subject of bargaining.14 Accordingly, the IELRB was not called upon to apply its
statutory test for identifying mandatory subjects of bargaining.
In Central City EducationAss'n v. IELRB, the Illinois Supreme
Court prescribed a three-part test to determine if a particular item
is a mandatory bargaining subject:
[The first part of the test] requires a determination of whether the
matter is one of wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment ....

If the answer to the first question is yes, then the sec-

ond question is asked: Is the matter also one of inherent managerial authority [under section 4 of the IELRAI?... If the answer is
yes, then the ... IELRB should balance the benefits that bargain-

ing will have on the decision-making process with the burdens
that bargaining imposes on the employer's authority. Which issues
are mandatory, and which are not, will be very fact-specific questions, which the IELRB is eminently qualified to resolve."'
The United States Supreme Court has developed a similar
statutory test for identifying mandatory subjects of bargaining in
the private sector. 6 That approach culminates in a balancing
test, utilizing factors that differ somewhat from those identified by
the Illinois Supreme Court."7 With respect to management decisions concerning the scope and direction of the enterprise that directly affect employment, the United States Supreme Court declared that companies subject to the NLRA should be required to
bargain "only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the
collective bargaining process, outweighs the burden placed on the
conduct of business.""8
The need to apply such a balancing test complicates application
of the University of Illinois standard."9 In practice, deferral may

114. See University of Ill., 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) 911035, at 155.
115. Central City Educ. Ass'n v. IELRB, 599 N.E.2d 892, 898 (111. 1992) (citations
omitted).
116. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981).
117. See id. at 678-79 (reasoning that management must be free from bargaining
process constraints to extent essential for operation of profitable business).
118. Id. at 679.
119. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. (Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill.
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be less likely if the statutory question involves the issues of
whether the item is a mandatory subject of bargaining, and, in
particular, if a fact-specific balancing test is implicated. The
IELRB's decision in Macomb Community Unit School District
185120 was such a case. There, the IELRB's Executive Director
had deferred to an arbitration award holding that the district did
not violate the contract by unilaterally implementing a building
security program, under which bargaining unit members were required to occasionally monitor a school entrance during planning
periods.' 2 ' The Executive Director used the University of Illinois
standard in deciding on deferral.'22
On appeal, the IELRB reversed as to the issue of deferral,
holding that the arbitrator's factual findings and contractual interpretations did not enable the agency to "resolve" the statutory issue
because the arbitrator did not reach the "benefits and burdens"
issue. 2 ' The arbitrator had stated that he was not determining
whether the change was an unlawful unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining.'24 In addition, the parties did not submit evidence to the arbitrator of the benefits and burdens of bargaining the matter in dispute.'
If the arbitration record does not contain evidence as to the
benefits and burdens of bargaining and factual findings on that
issue are required to resolve the statutory issue, then deferral is
not possible. In any given hearing, one of the parties may wish to
submit evidence on the statutory issue at the arbitration. Whether
that evidence is admitted into the hearing record is another question, however. The other party to the arbitration might object to its
inclusion on the grounds that the arbitrator does not need such
evidence to decide the contractual issue.
This possibility dramatically illustrates the divergent responsibilities of the agency and the arbitrator. The arbitrator need not
decide whether the disputed contract term is a mandatory bargain-

(LRP) 1035, at 155 (IELRB 1992).
120. 9 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1095, at 331 (IELRB 1992) (Macomb I), affd,
No. 4-93-0546 (Ill. App. Ct. June 29, 1994).
121. Macomb Community Sch. Dist. 185, 9 Pub. Empl. Rep. li. (LRP)
1041, at
132, 136 (IELRB 1991) (Macomb 1), rev'd, Macomb II, 9 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP)
1095, at 331, affd, No. 4-93-0546 (ill. App. Ct. June 29, 1994).
122. Id. at 135.
123. Macomb I1, 9 Pub. Empl. Rep. 11M.
(LRP) T11095, at 332.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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ing term under the statute, since the term is already within the
scope of the parties' agreement. Given arbitral reluctance to decide
issues outside the contract, an arbitrator may decide that evidence
proffered for purposes of applying a statutory test is not admissible.
Even if an arbitrator were inclined to admit such evidence, that
might not end the inquiry. Such evidence might require lengthy
testimony and numerous exhibits. The arbitrator might therefore
decide that addressing the benefits and burdens issue would overly
extend the record in the arbitration case.
On the other hand, the parties and the arbitrator could agree
to include the benefits and burdens evidence in order to provide a
stipulated record that would expedite subsequent unfair labor practice proceedings before the labor board. This is particularly likely to
occur if the dispute has already been referred to arbitration.
This was the approach used in Community College DistrictNo.
508.126 In that case, the IELRB referred a statutory unilateral
change complaint to the contractual arbitration procedure.'27 The
arbitrator determined that the employer did not violate the contract
by unilaterally canceling seven hundred classes for the fall of
1992.128 When the Executive Director declined to defer to the re-

sulting arbitration award, the statutory proceedings were reinstated.129 However, the parties then agreed that the record before the
IELRB would consist of the IELRB's procedural documents, the
arbitration transcript and exhibits, and the arbitrator's award."'
The parties also waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing before the IELRB, thus effectively agreeing that the IELRB would
accept the arbitrator's findings of fact, credibility resolutions, and
contractual interpretations."' The Administrative Law Judge held
that the arbitration award enabled him to resolve the unilateral
change issue. Based upon this stipulated record, the judge reasoned
that since the arbitrator had found that the employer did not act
inconsistently with the parties' established practices, no unilateral

126. 9 Pub. Emp. Rep. Ill. (LRP) %1068, at 241 (IELRB 1993) (DistrictNo. 508 If).
127. Community College Dist. No. 508 (Chicago City Colleges), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep.
Ill. (LRP) J 1085, at 316 (IELRB 1991) (DistrictNo. 508 .
128. District No. 508 II, 9 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill. (LRP) 1068, at 245. The arbitrator
refused to address these issues even though the parties had devoted considerable energy
to arguing the benefits of bargaining and burdens of negotiations, reasoning that such
consideration was appropriate only to resolve the unfair labor practice issues. Id.
129. Id. at 242.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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change had occurred.'32
This approach to arbitration evidence benefits both the parties
and the agency. Ordinarily, only one hearing is required (e.g., the
arbitration), the parties and the agency avoid additional costs, and
the agency's decisionmaking process is expedited.
The statutory burdens and benefits tests do not affect cases
like University of Illinois, where there was no issue as to whether
the Columbus Day holiday was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 3 ' There, the statutory issues centered on the employer's contractual discretion to change the holiday, whether the employer's
actions were consistent with the parties' practice, and whether the
holiday issue was fully bargained.' The statutory and contractual issues in such cases are fully congruent.
D. Acquiring Administrative Experience with the IELRB
Standard for Deferral
As previously discussed, the NLRB has experimented with
arbitration deferral standards for many years. As a result, the
NLRB has acquired considerable administrative experience while
applying the several divergent tests for deferral.'35 Administrative
experience notwithstanding, the NLRB and the federal courts have
not yet chosen a single test for determining when to defer.' 6 The
IELRB just marked its tenth year of existence administering the
IELRA, and it has only recently addressed deferral standards.'37
Like the NLRB, the IELRB is likely to encounter intricate issues
associated with the application of its University of Illinois standard.
The ultimate test of that standard's viability will be the IELRB's
ability to deal with those issues in a principled way.
Some of the issues associated with implementation of the
IELRB's standard may be anticipated based on the NLRB's experience in applying its divergent approaches in the private sector. For
132. Id.
133. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. (Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep. Ill.
(LRP) 1035, at 155, 156-57 (IELRB 1992).
134. Id.
135. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984); Suburban Motor Freight, Inc., 247
N.L.R.B. 146 (1980), overruled by Altoona Hosp., 270 N.L.R.B. 1179 (1984).
136. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d 744 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 61 (1992); Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
137. The IELRA took effect January 1, 1984. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 115, para. 5/1
(Smith-Hurd 1993).
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example, when applying the Suburban Motor Freight test, the
NLRB has grappled with the problem presented when evidence
relevant to resolving an unfair labor practice charge is not presented to the arbitrator."'5 In a dissenting opinion in Suburban Motor
Freight, Board Member Penello identified a further problem with
that approach:
Prior to the decision in Electronic Reproduction, it had been
the Board's practice in cases involving alleged discrimination in
employment not to defer to an arbitration award under Spielberg
unless the unfair labor practice issue had been both presented to
and considered by the arbitrator. Experience led the Board to conclude, however, that its practice invited parties to withhold evidence of discrimination during arbitration about disciplinary action in order to gain a second opportunity to challenge the same
action during an unfair labor practice proceeding." 9
Withheld facts may also be anticipated under the IELRB's
University of Illinois standard, since the IELRB relies upon the
arbitrator's findings of fact when independently determining the
statutory unfair labor practice issue. If facts relevant to the
statutory issue are missing from the arbitration decision, the
IELRB would presumably be forced to reinstate the administrative
proceedings in order to acquire the missing evidence, thus vitiating
the various benefits of employing a deferral policy in the first place.
To date, the IELRB has not encountered a case in which missing facts have led it to decline deferral and to order an unfair labor
practice hearing. Indeed, it would seem risky for a grievant and
union to intentionally omit relevant evidence before an arbitrator
simply to preserve a "second bite at the apple" before the administrative agency. What is the value of having two bites if one must
jeopardize the efficacy of the first bite in order to preserve the second bite? Moreover, the problem that the NLRB encountered arose
in discrimination cases, and the IELRB has yet to determine the
applicability of its deferral policy in such cases.
Assuming, however, that the problem of withheld evidence
138. In Yourga Trucking, Inc., 197 N.L.R.B. 928 (1972), the NLRB attempted to deal
with this problem by imposing on the party seeking deferral the burden of proving that
the unfair labor practice issue was litigated before the arbitrator. See Suburban Motor
Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 148.
139. Suburban Motor Freight, 247 N.L.R.B. at 148 (Penello, Member, dissenting); see
Electronic Reproduction Serv. Corp., 213 N.L.R.B. 578 (1974).
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occurred in a unilateral change situation or another setting in
which the IELRB has previously considered deferral, the IELRB
might solve the problem by employing burden of proof devices. For
example, in an unfair labor practice case where a union alleges that
an employer has made a unilateral change concerning a mandatory
subject of bargaining, the arbitrator's findings of fact may not be
sufficient or may omit evidence needed to decide the unfair labor
practice issue. In such a situation, the IELRB could place on the
party opposing deferral the burden to establish that it had no opportunity to present the missing facts to the arbitrator due to an
arbitral ruling excluding the proffered evidence. Alternatively, the
party seeking to ignore the arbitrator's award could prove that it
did in fact proffer the missing evidence, but that the arbitrator
omitted that evidence from the arbitration decision and award.
Using such burden of proof devices, the IELRB should be wellequipped to handle the problem of missing facts in arbitration decisions and other issues that may materialize as the IELRB implements its University of Illinois standard for deferral.
IV. CONCLUSION
The overlap arising when the same employer conduct arguably
gives rise to an unfair labor practice charge and a grievance has
generated considerable conflict over the standards that labor relations boards should apply when referring charges to the arbitration
process and deferring to the results of that process. 4 ° The NLRB
has vacillated between requiring that the arbitrator expressly consider and rule on the unfair labor practice issue as a condition for
deferring to the arbitrator's award, and deferring whenever the
contractual issue is factually parallel to the statutory issue and the
arbitrator was presented generally with the facts relevant to the
unfair labor practice.'
The IELRB's alternative deferral standard reflects a healthy
concern for the proper apportionment of administrative and arbitral
authority. The IELRB approach requires deferral to the arbitral
decision whenever the agency determines that the arbitrator's fac-

140. See supra text accompanying notes 15-23 for discussion of the jurisdictional
overlap between arbitrators and labor boards when employees file complaints alleging
both contractual breach and unfair labor practices.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 45-64 for discussion of cases in which the
NLRB developed its deferral policy.
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tual findings and contractual interpretations enable the agency to
resolve the unfair labor practice charge. The agency itself, however,
decides the statutory issues. Thus, the agency does not cede to the
arbitrator its authority to interpret and apply the governing labor
statute.
As discussed, the IELRB solution offers several advantages
over the NLRB's Olin and Suburban Motor Freightapproaches. The
IELRB approach"' is recommended as a model for other labor
boards for use in resolving deferral controversies.

142. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ill. (Chicago Campus), 8 Pub. Empl. Rep.
Ill. (LRP) 1035, at 155 (IELRB 1992).
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